A decision theory for partially consonant belief functions  by Giang, Phan H. & Shenoy, Prakash P.
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 375–394Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / i jarA decision theory for partially consonant belief functionsq
Phan H. Giang a,⇑, Prakash P. Shenoy b
aGeorge Mason University, 4400 University Dr., Fairfax, VA 22030, USA
bUniversity of Kansas, 1300 Sunnyside Ave., Lawrence, KS 66045, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tArticle history:
Received 23 November 2009
Received in revised form 19 August 2010
Accepted 6 September 2010
Available online 19 September 2010
Keywords:
Belief function theory
Decision theory
Ambiguity attitude
Statistical likelihood0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2010 Elsevier Inc
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2010.09.001
q A preliminary version of this paper appeared in
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 703 993 4226.
E-mail addresses: pgiang@gmu.edu (P.H. Giang),Partially consonant belief functions (pcb), studied by Walley, are the only class of
Dempster–Shafer belief functions that are consistent with the likelihood principle of
statistics. Structurally, the set of foci of a pcb is partitioned into non-overlapping groups
and within each group, foci are nested. The pcb class includes both probability function
and Zadeh’s possibility function as special cases. This paper studies decision making under
uncertainty described by pcb. We prove a representation theorem for preference relation
over pcb lotteries to satisfy an axiomatic system that is similar in spirit to von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s axioms of the linear utility theory. The closed-form expression of utility
of a pcb lottery is a combination of linear utility for probabilistic lottery and two-
component (binary) utility for possibilistic lottery. In our model, the uncertainty informa-
tion, risk attitude and ambiguity attitude are separately represented. A tractable technique
to extract ambiguity attitude from a decision maker behavior is also discussed.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In recent years, Dempster–Shafer (DS) belief function theory [3,4,23,33] has drawn increasing interest in the artiﬁcial
intelligence and statistics community. The main appeal of the DS theory is its ability to faithfully express a wider class of
uncertainty such as notions of ambiguity and ignorance that are not expressible by standard probability. Another advantage
of DS theory, as its proponents argue, is the close link to evidence, which is the objective source of uncertainty.
The statistical inference problem is an important background for belief function theory. Dempster [3] and Shafer [24]
have demonstrated how belief function theory generalizes Bayesian statistical inference. This generalization allows prior
knowledge as well as conditional models to be described by belief functions rather than by probability functions.
The inclusion of Bayesian inference as a special case provides an opportunity to validate belief function theory against a
number of fundamental principles on which statistics is founded. Walley [30] studies two functionals Q and R that represent,
in terms of commonality functions, observational and prior evidences, respectively. He ﬁnds (Theorem 3, [30]) that in order
to be consistent with Bayes rule, belief functions representing observations must have a special structure. In this class, the
set of foci are partitioned into non-overlapping groups. Within each partition, foci are nested. Such belief functions are called
partially consonant or pcb for short. The pcb class is rich enough to include as special cases probability functions (each sin-
gleton is a partition) and Zadeh’s possibility functions (foci are nested within each other).
Initially, consonant belief functions were used by Shafer [23] to represent statistical evidence. Later, Shafer [24] renounces
the idea on the grounds that the set of consonant belief functions is not closed under Dempster’s rule of combination. This. All rights reserved.
[11].
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(compound) observation. So either Dempster’s rule is not suitable for combination of independent evidences or the conso-
nant form is not appropriate for representation of evidence. Shafer gives up the latter and keeps the former. However, Walley
[30], facing the same choices, comes to a different conclusion. Arguing that (1) the conditions by which Dempster’s rule is
consistent with Bayes’ rule are too restrictive, and (2) Dempster’s rule is only one among several rules for evidence combi-
nation with desirable properties, Walley concludes that Dempster’s rule is suitable for neither combining independent
observations nor combining prior belief with observational evidence.
An open problem is the use of belief functions for decision making. The main issue here is that a departure from proba-
bility also means the loss of Bayesian decision theory which ranks alternatives by their expected utilities (EU). A number of
proposals have been proposed in literature. One basic idea is to ﬁnd a transformation that converts a belief function into a
probability function and then use the probability function for decision making [26,2] according to Bayesian decision theory.
Under certain condition, a belief function is characterized by a set of probability functions. This view enables decision mak-
ing, for example, by maximin rule i.e., maximize the minimum of expected utilities calculated for compatible probability
functions. An axiomatic approach can also be used for decision making with belief function. In [16,18] a weakening of Sa-
vage’s ‘‘sure-thing principle” leads to a utility representation. Another approach is to use techniques developed for more gen-
eral uncertainty measure, e.g., lower prevision [31], capacity [21,22], which includes belief functions as a special class. We
will discuss these works in more details in Section 5.
In this paper, we propose a decision theory assuming that uncertainty is represented by a pcb. The paper is structured as
follows. Properties of partial consonant belief functions are studied in the next section. In Section 3, after a brief review of the
vNM axioms that lead to expected utility (EU) representation of probabilistic lotteries as well as the axioms that lead to bin-
ary qualitative utility (QU) representation of possibilistic lotteries, we introduce an axiom system for pcb lotteries and prove
a representation theorem. We present examples in Section 4. Section 5 discusses related literature. The ﬁnal section has
some concluding remarks. All the proofs of statements in the paper are placed in the Appendix A.
For convenience, we list an incomplete inventory of notations used in the paper:H is used for parameter space; U – space
of decision outcomes; w – an outcome; upper case letters at the beginning of alphabet A, B, C, . . . denote events or subsets of
parameter space; upper case letters at the end X, Y, Z for variables; lower case letters x, y, z for their values; lower case letters
f, g for acts which also are denoted as set with {,} boundaries; L for lottery which also use square bracket boundaries [,]; P, p
for probability; P, p for possibility; Pl for plausibility; m for mass function; L for lottery set; Greek lower letters k, q for the
left and right components of a two-component utility; set of such elements is denoted byW; for preference relation; Lik for
(normalized) likelihood; For the rest of this paper slash ‘‘/” does not denote arithmetic division, it is used to separate degree
of uncertainty and associated outcome.
2. Partially consonant belief functions
2.1. Walley’s derivation
Walley [30] has derived pcb in the context of the statistical inference problem. The statistical inference problem is de-
scribed by a triplet of sets ðX ;H;PÞ where X is the sample space, H is the parameter space and P is the set of uncertainty
measures on X indexed by parameter values inH. A statistical evidence/observation/data is a value x 2 X . The prior knowl-
edge about parameters may or may not exist. The objective is to make inference about the unobserved parameter h 2H of
the data generating process.
The Bayesian theory assumes that (1) P = {Phjh 2H} is the set of probability functions on X parameterized by elements of
H; and (2) prior knowledge exists and is represented by a probability function on H. The observational evidence and prior
knowledge are then combined by Bayes rule.
The likelihood principle (LP) of statistics states that information contained in an observation x is adequately captured by
the likelihood function derived from it. The likelihood of a parameter h given an observation x is the probability of observing
x if h is the true parameter i.e., likx(h) = Ph(x). Moreover, proportional likelihood functions are equivalent [1].
Dempster [3], and later Shafer [23,24], arguing that prior knowledge and models can not always be adequately repre-
sented by probability, suggest a more general representation using belief functions. For the sake of self-containedness we
repeat basic deﬁnitions and well known facts about DS theory. A basic probability assignment (bpa), also known as mass func-
tion, is deﬁned as follows:1 In l
uncerta
functionm : 2H ! ½0;1; ð1Þ
such that m(;) = 0 andPA#HmðAÞ ¼ 1. The value m(A) is often interpreted as the probability that a state in A will be the true
state. A set with positive mass is called a focus. From a mass function, bel1 (Bel), plausibility (Pl) and commonality (Q) functions
can be deﬁned:iterature, the term belief function is used in two slightly different senses: a narrower sense refers to function Bel deﬁned in (2) and a broader sense to
inty information represented by any of m, Bel, Pl or Q. To avoid confusion we adopt a convention to use ‘‘bel function” in the narrower sense and ‘‘belief
” in the broader sense.
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X
B#A
mðBÞ PlðAÞ ¼def
X
B\A–;
mðBÞ QðAÞ ¼def
X
A#B
mðBÞ: ð2ÞNotice thatm, Bel, Pl, Q are different forms of the same DS belief function since starting from any of them, the other three can
be completely recovered using Möbius transforms [23].
Belief function theory provides a clear framework to discuss the notion of ambiguity.
Deﬁnition 1. Given a belief function, an event A is said to be ambiguous if there exists a focus that intersects with both A and
its complement A.
An ambiguous event A is characterized by a strict inequality PlðAÞ þ PlðAÞ > 1 (equivalently BelðAÞ þ BelðAÞ < 1). This is the
case because (i) there exists a focus B whose strictly positive mass m(B) is counted twice in both Pl(A) and PlðAÞ and (ii) the
mass of any other focus is counted at least in either Pl(A) or PlðAÞ. Conversely, an unambiguous event is characterized by equa-
tion PlðAÞ þ PlðAÞ ¼ 1. If an event is (un) ambiguous then so is its complement. Intuitively, an unambiguous event and its
complement separate the set of foci into two non-overlapping groups and the plausibility of an unambiguous event can
be interpreted as probability.
The independent belief functions are combined via Dempster’s rule. Suppose m1, m2 are two belief functions with foci B1j
and B2h respectively. Their combination is a belief function denoted by (m1 m2) deﬁned as follows:ðm1 m2ÞðAÞ ¼ k1
X
B1j\B2h¼A
m1ðB1jÞ m2ðB2hÞ; ð3Þwhere k ¼PB1j\B2h–;m1ðB1jÞm2ðB2hÞ is a normalization constant. Since (1  k) can be viewed as the mass assigned to the
empty set, it can be interpreted as the extent of inconsistency between m1 and m2.
In the special case when m2 is an elementary belief function representing the observation B(m2(B) = 1), m1 m2 is called
the conditional of m1 given B (write m1(jB)). In terms of Pl, a conditional belief function assumes a familiar form:PlðAjBÞ ¼ PlðA \ BÞ
PlðBÞ : ð4ÞIn the statistical inference method argued by Shafer [24], prior knowledge, assumed models and observations are all repre-
sented in terms of belief functions. Inference is carried out by combining these belief functions using Dempster’s rule.
Since prior probability and conditional probabilities in Bayesian model are also belief functions, Walley asks under which
conditions their combination by Dempster’s rule is consistent with Bayes’ rule. He chooses to work with commonality form
for convenience. Speciﬁcally, Walley studies functional Q that translates a likelihood function which summarizes the Bayes-
ian model (X,H,P) and an observation x into a commonality function Q, and functional R that translates a prior probability
into a commonality function R. There are a number of desirable properties that Q, R (two-place mappings) should satisfy.
Some technical assumptions are made. H is ﬁnite jHj = n. S is the set of likelihood vectors, P is the set of prior probability
vectors. In the axioms listed below (according to Walley’s original order), s,r stand for arbitrary likelihood vectors in S, q for
any prior probability in P. Their components are denoted by subscripts. IB is the characteristic function of subset B # H.
A1 Q(,s) is a commonality function over H.
A2 Q(,s)  Q(,r) = Q(,sr) if sr 2 S.
A3 R(,q) is a commonality function over H.
A4 If qjsj > 0 for some j, R(,q)  Q(,s) = R(,sq) where  denotes Bayes’ rule.
A7 Q(,s) = Q(,cs) for 0 < c < 1.
A8 Q(,1)  Q(,s) = Q(,s).
A9 If s 2 S and sIB 2 S then Q(A,sIB) / Q(A,s) when A # B and Q(A,sIB) = 0 otherwise.
A1 and A3 require that any observational evidence (likelihood function) and prior probability can be converted into belief
function form. A2 requires that two views on multiple independent observations as a compound evidence and as the com-
bination of individual evidence are equivalent. A4 requires that belief function treatment is consistent with Bayesian treat-
ment when applicable. A7 and A8 force Q under Dempster’s rule to be consistent with the LP. A9 imposes consistency with
Bayesian conditioning. Walley proves the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Walley [30]). Assumptions A1, A3, A4, A7, A8 and A9 and a number of technical conditions hold if and only if there is
some k > 0 and some partition {A1,A2, . . . ,As} of H such that for all q 2 P and s 2 S:Rðfhig;qÞ ¼ qki
Xn
j¼1
qkj
,
; ð5Þ
Q ðA; sÞ ¼ kðsÞmin ski jhi 2 A
 
when A 2
[
16i6s
2Ai ; ð6Þ
Q ð;; sÞ ¼ 1 and Q ðA; sÞ ¼ 0 otherwise; ð7Þ 
where kðsÞ ¼ Psj¼1 max ski jhi 2 Aj  1. In addition, assumption A2 is satisﬁed only if s = n.
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cable, belief function representation must have a special form. It should be mentioned that k in (6) can be interpreted as the
scale parameter and can be used to manipulate the weight of evidence, if necessary. For convenience, we ignore the dis-
counting evidence issue and assume hereafter that k = 1.
2.2. Decomposition of partially consonant belief function
Our attention is on belief functions that are obtained from statistical evidence i.e., those obtained from application of
functional Q on likelihood vectors. The reason we ignore belief functions produced by the functional R is twofold. From a
practical point of view, the prior is not always available. From a conceptual point of view, if the prior probability is
available then, by Bayes theorem, posterior probability can be computed, therefore, Bayesian decision theory is
applicable.
It can be seen that (6), (7) of Theorem 1 imply a special arrangement of the foci of a belief function. First, (6) and (7) jointly
say that the commonality of a set can be positive if and only if it is a subset of one of A1, A2, . . . ,As that form a partition ofH. In
terms of foci, because the commonality of a focus is positive, it must be a subset of some Ai. Second, for any pair of foci B1, B2
that are subsets of Ai, one focus must be a subset of the other in order to satisfy (6). Let us consider the commonality values
Q(B1,s), Q(B2,s) and Q(B1 [ B2,s). By (6), Q ðB1; sÞ ¼ sj1 where sj1 ¼minfskjhk 2 B1g, Q ðB2; sÞ ¼ sj2 where sj2 ¼ minfsljhl 2 B2g
and Q(B1 [ B2,s) = sj where sj = min{sm jhm 2 B1 [ B2}. Hence, either Q(B1,s) = Q(B1 [ B2,s) or Q(B2,s) = Q(B1 [ B2,s). From
Q(B1,s) = Q(B1 [ B2,s), it follows that B1 = B1 [ B2, equivalently B2  B1. Suppose the contrary B1– B1 [ B2. Since (i) any focus
that is a superset of B1 [ B2 is also a superset of B1 and (ii) focus B1 is a superset of itself but is not a superset of B1 [ B2, the
sum of masses of foci that go into Q(B1,s) is strictly larger than the sum of masses that go into Q(B1 [ B2,s) i.e.,
Q(B1,s) > Q(B1 [ B2,s). This contradicts condition Q(B1,s) = Q(B1 [ B2,s). A belief function that satisﬁes (6) and (7) is called
a partially consonant belief function. Equivalently, in terms of mass function we have a formal deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2. A belief function deﬁned onH is called partially consonant if its foci can be divided into groups such that (a) the
foci of different groups do not intersect and (b) the foci of the same group are nested.
The pcb concept includes as a special case the concept of consonant belief function considered in [23] in which foci are
nested, one inside another. For a consonant belief function, its plausibility form Pl satisﬁes max-decomposition property
Pl(A [ B) = max (Pl(A),Pl(B)) for A,B # H. This property together with a normalization condition Pl(H) = 1 ensure that the
plausibility form of a consonant belief function satisﬁes characterizing axioms of the possibility measure which has origin
in fuzzy set theory [34] and has been extensively studied by Dubois and Prade and others (see for example [6]). In this paper,
however, we use the term possibility function according to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3. Suppose a belief function has nested foci B1  B2  . . .  Bn, then its plausibility function Pl is called a possibility
function.
Note that the conditioning notion derived by Dempster’s rule applied for consonant belief functions corresponds to the
notion of quantitative conditioning often described in possibility theory literature [6].
Because the satisfaction of Dempster’s rule requires evidence presented as probability (s = n), Walley suggests that Demp-
ster’s rule cannot be used to combine independent observations. However, all the axioms above (including A2) are satisﬁed if
Dempster’s rule is replaced by another rule (	) deﬁned as follows:2 It is
h 2 B an
only anðQ1 	 Q2ÞðAÞ ¼def
kminfQ1ðhÞQ2ðhÞjh 2 Ag if Q1ðAÞ  Q2ðAÞ > 0;
0 otherwise;

ð8Þwhere k is a constant selected so that Q12 is a commonality function.
The signiﬁcance of Walley’s result is that (1) it points out the incompatibility between Dempster’s rule and the likelihood
principle in general,2 and (2) it isolates a subclass of belief functions representing likelihood information that is consistent with
the likelihood principle and Bayesian inference (applicable when prior is available). The pcb class includes probability functions
and possibility functions as special cases (s = n and s = 1 respectively). In the intermediate case 1 < s < n, pcb has a remarkable
interpretation: it can be viewed as a model for several possibilistic variables conditioned on a probabilistic variable.
We prove some useful properties of pcb in the plausibility form.
Deﬁnition 4. Suppose fAigsi¼1 is a partition of H. A pcb with foci Aij with structure Ai ¼ Ai0 
 Ai1 
 . . . 
 Aiki for 1 6 i 6 s. A
denotes the algebra formed from collection {A1,A2, . . . ,As}, and Ai is the algebra formed from the elements of Ai.necessary to note that for conditioning, the most important special case of evidence combination (when new evidence is an observation B i.e., Q2(h) = 1 if
d Q2(h) = 0 otherwise), Dempster’s rule and Walley’s rule are equivalent (Q1  Q2 = Q1 	 Q2). For the rest of this work, we are interested in conditioning
d therefore Dempster’s rule is completely adequate. In other words, results in this paper are not pre-conditioned on the rejection of Dempster’s rule.
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Deﬁnition 5
(i) An event B # H is called possibilistic w.r.t. a plausibility function Pl if Pl(jB) is a possibility function.
(ii) An event B # H is called maximally possibilistic if B is possibilistic and any strict superset of B is not a possibilistic
event.Lemma 1
(a) The plausibility function of a pcb in Deﬁnition 4 has the form:PlðAÞ ¼
Xs
i¼1
maxfPlðhÞ j h 2 Ai \ Ag ð9Þ(b) A conditional pcb is again a pcb.
(c) An event B is unambiguous iff B 2 A.
(d) B # Ai for some i iff B is possibilistic.
From part (c), it follows that A is the algebra of unambiguous events characterized by pcb i.e., restricted to A, Pl is a prob-
ability function. From part (d) it is clear that Ai are maximally possibilistic.
Theorem 2. For the plausibility function Pl given in (9) and 1 6 i 6 s:
PðAÞ ¼def PlðAÞ for A 2 A is a probability function on A; ð10Þ
PiðBÞ ¼def PlðBjAiÞ for B 2 Ai is a possibility function on Ai; ð11ÞConversely, if a plausibility function Pl that satisﬁes (10) and (11) i.e., Pl() is a probability function on A and Pl(jAi) are possibility
functions on Ai then it is a pcb and satisﬁes (9).
Using variables to represent H, the decomposition looks even more appealing. One has a probabilistic variable X whose
domain has size s i.e., x1, x2, . . . ,xs. Conditional on each value xi one has a possibilistic variable Yi whose domain has sizemi i.e.,
yi1; yi2; . . . ; yimi . Then each element h ofH is characterized by a pair of values (xiyik) of X and Y. For each i, partition Ai is the set
{(xiyik)j1 6 k 6mi}.
Usually, decomposition is not a information-preserving operation i.e., the original whole is not recoverable from the
decomposed parts. However, the decomposition of a pcb into a probability function and s possibility functions is informa-
tion-preserving.
Example 1. Suppose there are two variables X, Y whose domains are {x1,x2} and {y1,y2,y3}. A pcb and its decomposition are
given as follows:Focus {x1y1,x1y2,x1y3} {x1y1,x1y2} {x1y1} {x2y1,x2y2} {x2y1}Mass 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3P(YjX) y1 y2 y3 P(X)
x1 1.0 0.83 0.5 0.6
x2 1.0 0.25 0.0 0.43. Decision making
Given the importance of Walley’s result, it is somewhat puzzling that pcb has not received the attention it deserves. This
situation could be explained by the fact thatWalley himself seems to dismiss pcb’s usefulness on the ground that the sure-loss
or ‘‘Dutch book” argument can still be made against the use of pcb in decision making. To reach this conclusion, Walley
assumes that functions Bel and Pl of a pcb are interpreted as lower and upper betting rates. In the subsequent sections, we
develop a decision theory with pcb which voids this Dutch book argument. Speciﬁcally, we argue that Walley’s interpretation
of plausibility as a upper betting rate is not justiﬁed for belief functions originated from statistical evidence. The difference
between our treatment of belief functions and Walley’s betting rate mirrors the difference between the notions of statistical
likelihood and probability. It is obvious that given prior probability, statistical likelihood and probability are functionally
dependent via Bayes formula. However, in the absence of prior, the treatment of likelihood as probability/betting rate is a
mistake.
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the preference relation over lotteries on the prize set that are induced by acts. Since the pcb includes both probability and
possibility functions as special cases, it is natural to expect that the decision theory to be developed for pcb will subsume the
theories for probabilistic and possibilistic uncertainty. We start by reviewing these special cases and then move to the gen-
eral case.3.1. Decision problem, acts and lotteries
A decision problem under uncertainty is a tuple ðS;D;A;UÞ where S is assumed to be a ﬁnite set. D is a uncertainty mea-
sure over the algebra of subsets of S. We assume thatD is equipped with a conditionalization operator that transformsD into
a new uncertainty measure DE on the algebra of subsets of E for E # S. U is the set of prizes. For the sake of clarity, we make
the following assumption about prizes.
Assumption 1
(1) U is identiﬁed to the real unit interval [0,1] and
(2) the value of prize is measured in the risk-adjusted utility unit.
This assumption allows us to ignore the scaling and risk attitude issues and focus on the ambiguity. In the discussion, we
show how risk attitude can be accounted in this framework. Thus, 1 is the best (most desirable) and 0 the worst (least desir-
able) prizes in U .
A is the set of acts which is deﬁned recursively. Each prizew 2 U is an act (called constant act or act of depth 0) i.e., U ¼ A0.
A simple act is a mapping of the form d: S? A0. The semantics of acts is obtained through the gambling interpretation. Act d
is a gamble that if s is the true state of nature then d(s) is the prize. The set of simple acts is denoted by A1. Clearly, A0  A1
because a prize w can be identiﬁed with the mapping "s 2 S, s´w.
Another notation for an act is by a set of rules. A rule is denoted by a hook arrow ,! to differentiate from a mapping de-
noted by a straight arrow?. d = {Ei ,!wi ji 2 I} where I is an index set, {Eiji 2 I} is a partition of S and Ei = d1(wi) - the event
whose occurrence triggers prize wi.
An act of depth k is deﬁned as a set of rules {Ei ,! diji 2 I} where di 2 Ak1 – an act of depth no more than k  1. It is a
gamble that instead of a prize in U will deliver a ticket to play another gamble. The act set A is deﬁned as A1 ¼ Sk2NAk.
Visually, an act is a rooted tree [5]. The root node is labeled with S. A rule Ei ,! di corresponds to an edge labeled with Ei
from the root to a node which is the root of the tree representing di. The labels of the children of a node constitute a partition
of its label. The leaves of the tree are prizes in U . The natural orientation of any edge in a rooted tree is the direction away
from the root. For example, the tree in Fig. 1 represents act {E1 ,! {F1 ,!w1,F2 ,!w2},E2 ,!w3}. The reading of this example
is that if E1 occurs then the decision maker receives a gamble (if F1 occurs then w1 and if F2 then w2); if E2 occurs then w3.
Logically, it is equivalent to three rules: if E1 and F1 then w1; if E1 and F2 then w2; and if E2 then w3 i.e.,
{E1 \ F1 ,!w1,E1 \ F2 ,!w2, E2 ,!w3}.
In general, for a given leaf wi, suppose the labels on the path from the root to the leaf are E
ðiÞ
1 ; E
ðiÞ
2 ; . . . ; E
ðiÞ
k . The operational
semantics of the rules consisting the path reads: ‘‘if EðiÞ1 and E
ðiÞ
2 and . . . E
ðiÞ
k occur then prize wi is delivered” which means a
rule \kj¼1EðiÞj ,!wi. Repeating the argument for each leaf, we demonstrate the fact that every act is logically equivalent to a
simple act (of depth 1). This is referred to as the principle of equivalence. The difference between an act of depth k and its
equivalent version of depth 1 is in the order the information about the true state of nature is revealed.
Deﬁnition 6. Two acts f and g are equivalent if the ﬁnal prizes they deliver are the same no matter which state obtains i.e.,
f(s) = g(s) for any s 2 S.Fig. 1. Equivalent acts.
P.H. Giang, P.P. Shenoy / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 375–394 381Example 2. In Fig. 1, S describes possible outcomes of a dice rolling i.e., natural numbers from 1 to 6. E1 is ‘‘an odd number”,
E2 is ‘‘an even number”, F1 is ‘‘greater than 4” and F2 is ‘‘less than or equal to 4”. For the gamble on the left, the outcome of
rolling is revealed in the answers to two questions: the ﬁrst is whether the number is odd or even, the second is about the
magnitude. In the case of an even number, the prize is w3 = 0, in the case of an odd number, the player gets a ticket to a gam-
ble which is resolved on the same dice roll: if the roll is higher than 4 then player gets w1 = $1; if the number is 4 or less then
the player gets w2 = $0.5.
The gamble on the right has the rules: if the number is even then the player gets w3 = 0, if the number is 5 then w1 = $1, if
the number is 1 or 3 then the player gets w2 = $0.5. It is easy to verify that no matter what the outcome of the dice rolling is,
both gambles deliver the same prize and therefore are equivalent. Note that this equivalence is established before the issue
of uncertainty is considered. We insist that the equivalence will hold under any uncertainty measure.
In a rooted tree, each node is associated with (a) an event which is the conjunction of events on the path from the tree’s
root to the node and (b) a subtree that consists of the node itself and all the nodes down the stream.
Suppose di is a subtree of d (notation d[di]) and d
0
i is another tree. d di=d
0
i
 
denotes a tree obtained by replacing subtree di
by d0i.
With the introduction of uncertainty D, a rooted tree (act) gets uncertainty annotation. Each node N is associated with a
conditional measure DEN ðÞ orD(jEN) where EN is the conjunction of the events labeling the edges on the path from the root to
the node. The decision maker is moving along a tree as she learns about the realization of events. At each node, she updates
her belief based on the information learned so far. In the example of the left tree in Fig. 1, after being told that the dice roll is
an odd number (E1) she would move from root (0) to node 1. At this point, she would condition her belief on that fact.
Each edge labeled with F emanating from N is associated with DEN ðFÞ. For example, in the left tree in Fig. 1, the root is
associated with set S and uncertaintyD. Node 1 is associated with event E1 and conditional DE1 . The edge leading to 1 is asso-
ciated with D(E1), the edge from 1 to w1 with DE1 ðF1Þ and so on.
For example, the path leading to w1 on the left tree of Fig. 1 is associated with D(E1) and DE1 ðF1Þ while on the right tree,
associated with w1 is D(E1&F1).
A node is called ambiguous (unambiguous) if the event associated with it is ambiguous (unambiguous).
A lottery is obtained from an act (tree) by replacing all the labeling events by corresponding uncertainty values. For exam-
ple, the label E1 of the edge from the root to node 1 is replaced by D(E1) and label F1 by DE1 ðF1Þ and so on. In other words, in a
lottery, the nature of events are abstracted away. This is justiﬁed by an assumption that the given uncertainty measure cap-
tures all information relevant to the decision problem. For example, act {E1 ,! {F1 ,!w1, F2 ,! w2},E2 ,! w3} corresponds to
lottery ½DðE1Þ=½DE1 ðF1Þ=w1;DE1 ðF2Þ=w2;DðE2Þ=w3. Note the notational difference: in a lottery square brackets [,] are used in-
stead of {,}, and slash/is used instead of ,!.
3.2. Linear utility for probabilistic lottery
When D is a probability function on S, the lotteries are called probabilistic. For example [p1/w1,p2/w2, . . . ,pk/wk] wherePk
i¼1pi ¼ 1. The set of probabilistic lotteries is denoted by LP .
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s utility theory (the exposition by Luce and Raiffa [19]) considers a preference relation3
P on LP that is assumed to satisfy the following axioms.
P1 (Strong order on prizes) PreferenceP on U is identical withP(‘‘greater than or equal to”) relation on reals i.e.,w1  Pw2
iff w1Pw2. In particular, 1  P0 and for all w 2 U , 1  Pw and w  P0.
P2 (Reduction of compound lotteries) Any compound lottery is indifferent to a simple lottery with prizes in U. Moreover,
the probability attached to each prize in the simple lottery is the sum of the probabilities of the paths leading to the
prize in the compound lottery.
P3 (Continuity) Each prize w 2 U is indifferent to a probabilistic canonical lottery involving just 1 and 0.
P4 (Substitutability) In any lottery, each prize can be replaced by the probabilistic canonical lottery that is indifferent to it.
P5 (Transitivity) P on LP is transitive.
P6 (Monotonicity) [p/1, (1  p)/0]  P[p0/1, (1  p0)/0] iff pP p0.
Note that the formulation of P1 is stronger than the corresponding version found in [19] in the sense that it makes the  P
restricted on U a strong rather than weak order. This formulation is the consequence of our assumption that U measures the
risk-adjusted utility.
The ﬁrst part of P2 is justiﬁed by the principle of equivalence. The second part of P2 says that if a lottery L (a rooted tree)
has k paths from the root leading to prize w with path probabilities pi 1 6 i 6 k then L is indifferent to a simple lottery L0 that
has probability associated with w: pw ¼
Pk
i¼1pi. This is a result of additivity of probability.
The concept of probabilistic canonical lottery is used in P3, P4 and P6. A lottery is canonical if its prize set has only two
elements: the best and the worst prize in U i.e., [p/1, (1  p)/0].3 Strict preference (P) and indifference (P) are deﬁned from P as usual.
382 P.H. Giang, P.P. Shenoy / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 375–394Theorem 3 (von Neumann and Morgenstern [27]). P satisﬁes axioms P1–P6 iff there exists a utility function u : LP ! ½0;1
such that L1  L2 iff u(L1)P u(L2). In particular, it satisﬁesuð½p1=w1;p2=w2; . . . ;pn=wnÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
pi:wi: ð12ÞFrom (12), u(w) = w for all w 2 U. This is the case because the risk attitude has been assumed away and the utility scale is
ﬁxed to the unit interval.3.3. Binary utility for possibilistic lottery
Following vNM approach, in [10,13] a utility theory is developed for the case when D is a possibility function. For exam-
ple, [p1/w1,p2/w2,. . .,pk/wk] is a possibilistic lottery. pi is the possibility of getting prize wi with maxipi = 1. The set of possi-
bilistic lotteries is denoted by LP. A preference relation  P on LP satisﬁes the following axioms.
PP1 (Strong order on prizes) Preference P on U is identical with P(‘‘greater than or equal to”) relation on reals i.e.,
w1  Pw2 iff w1Pw2. In particular, 1  P0 and for all w 2 U;1Pw and w  P0.
PP2 (Reduction of compound lotteries) Any compound lottery is indifferent to a simple lottery with prizes in U . Moreover,
the possibility of a prize in the simple lottery is the maximum of the possibilities of the paths leading to the prize in
the compound lottery.
PP3 (Continuity) Each prize w 2 U is indifferent to a possibilistic canonical lottery involving just 1 and 0.
PP4 (Substitutability) In any lottery, each prize can be replaced by the canonical lottery that is indifferent to it.
PP5 (Transitivity) P on LP is transitive.
PP6 (Monotonicity) [k/1,q/0]  P [k0/1,q0/0] iff kP k0 and q 6 q0.
This axiom system PP has the same structure as the vNM system P except for the replacement of probability by possibility
which is not additive but is max decomposable.
Deﬁnition 7 (Ordered set of two-component elements). LetW be the set of two-component (binary) elements such that each
component of an element is a real number in the unit interval and the maximum of two components of an element is 1 (see
Fig. 2)W ¼deffhk;qijk;q 2 ½0;1;maxðk;qÞ ¼ 1g
An order  together with two operations: component-wise maximization cmax and product are deﬁned on W as
follows:hk;qihk0;q0i iff kP k0 and q 6 q0; ð13Þ
cmax hk;qi; hk0;q0ið Þ ¼defhmax k; k0ð Þ; max q;q0ð Þi; ð14Þ
p  hk;qi ¼defhp  k;p  qi for 0 6 p 6 1: ð15ÞTwo comments are in order. First, W can be thought of as the set of possibility functions on {1,0}. Conveniently, the left
component can be thought of as the index of goodness (the more the better) while the right - the index of badness (the less
the better). The only thing unusual here is that goodness and badness are not additive. According to, h1,0i is the top ele-
ment while h0,1i is the bottom element. Second, it is not necessary that cmax (hk,qi, hk0,q0i) hk,qi nor cmax
(hk,qi, hk0,q0i)hk0,q0i. In this notation, a representation theorem for possibilistic lottery is as follows.Fig. 2. Utility scale W: left component is on horizontal axis, right – vertical.
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ðaÞ P1;P2 2 LP; P1PP2 iff tðP1ÞtðP2Þ ð16Þ
ðbÞ tð1Þ ¼ h1;0i; tð0Þ ¼ h0;1i ð17Þ
ðcÞ tð½p1=w1;p2=w2; . . . ;pm=wmÞ ¼ cmax16i6mfpi:tðwiÞg ð18ÞThe difference between this theorem and one by vNM is that for possibilistic lotteries the binary utility scaleW and cmax
are used instead of the real unit interval and summation. The relation between the binary utility and the scalar utility has a
parallel in the relation between possibility and probability. In possibility theory, uncertainty of an event is characterized by a
pair of necessity and possibility while the probability of an event is a single number. Interested readers are referred to [8] for
a detailed discussion.
An issue that needs clariﬁcation is the operational semantics of binary utility. In [12,13] a framework called the likelihood
gamble has been proposed. This is a betting framework but instead of using probability, a person uses statistical likelihood
information to make her bets. The rules of the game are the following.
R1 A parameter  has two possible values {1,2}. Each parameter value corresponds to a probability distribution Pi ðÞ on
a sample space X . The gambler is told about this information.
R2 A computer selects a value for the parameter and generates an observation according to the corresponding probability
distribution. Suppose that the obtained observation is x.
R3 The observation x, but not the value of the parameter, is disclosed to the gambler.
R4 The gambler is offered the following contract:Payoff ¼ $1 if 1 is the computer selected value;
$0 if 2 is the computer selected value;
If w is the price that the gambler is willing to pay for the contract then we say she is indifferent between w and possibilistic
lottery [Likx(1)/1, Likx(2)/0] where Likx(i) is normalized likelihood of observing x if i is selected i.e.,LikxðiÞ ¼ Pi ðxÞmax P1 ðxÞ; P2 ðxÞ
	 
 :The reason that allows us to make the connection between the gambler’s choice and her indifference is the likelihood prin-
ciple. Because likelihood function is sufﬁcient statistic, without loss of information, in rule R3, instead of being told about the
observation, she can be told about the likelihood function associated with it. And since proportional likelihood functions are
equivalent, instead of a likelihood function, one can use its normalized version.
A discernible reader will notice both the similarity and the distinction between this likelihood gamble and the classic coin
tossing gamble used to assess linear utility. The main difference is that in the coin tossing gamble, the rewards depend on the
states (head/tail) for which the gambler knows the probability while in the likelihood gamble she knows only the likelihood
of undisclosed parameter value.
In this likelihood gamble approach, the possibility degree of an event – the plausibility of a consonant belief function – is
not treated as an upper betting rate (probability) as suggested by Walley [31] but as the (statistical) likelihood. Obviously,
Walley’s sure-loss argument against the use of pcb has no force with respect to likelihood gambles.
As it is the case with linear utility for probabilistic lotteries, the possibilistic utility function (Eq. (18)) is determined by its
values on U . The behavior of t on U reveals what we call attitude toward ambiguity. Let us denote by tU the restriction of t on U
i.e., tU : U ! W deﬁned as tU : w#tðwÞ. tU can be viewed as a pair of real functions h‘,ri where ‘ : U ! ½0;1 and r : U ! ½0;1.
However, not all function pairs can be tU because of constraint max (‘(x),r(x)) = 1. In general there is no requirement for ‘ and
r to be continuous. For example, the following is perfectly acceptable:‘ðxÞ ¼ 1 if xP 0:5
1:4x if x < 0:5

and rðxÞ ¼ 1:6ð1 xÞ if xP 0:5;
1 if x < 0:5;
In this paper, we make the regularity assumption.
Assumption 2. t, as a vector function, is continuous in both components i.e., for ‘ and r of t, limx?a‘(x) = ‘(a) and
limx ? ar(x) = r(a) for a 2 [0,1].Lemma 2. Under continuity assumption of t; tðUÞ ¼ W.
Recall that U  LP because w 2 U can be identiﬁed with lottery [1/w]. By the representation result, t(L) = t(w) for any
L 2 LP such that L  Pw. Technically, the inverse of t is undetermined. However, abusing the notation slightly we deﬁne a
function.
Deﬁnition 8. Function t1 : W! U is deﬁned by the condition:
t1ðtðwÞÞ#w for w 2 U: ð19Þ
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fore by Eq. (19) t1(hk, qi) = w. Moreoverw that satisﬁes t(w) = hk, qi is unique because if, on the contrary, there were another
w0 –w such that t(w0) = hk, qi. By representation theorem, w  Pw0. This would violate the strong order on prizes PP1.
While t1 is deﬁned to satisfy the cancellation t1(t(w)) = w. The cancellation tt1 also holds. Suppose that hk,qi = t(w) for
some w 2 U . Then t1(hk,qi) = t1(t(w)) =w. Applying t on both sides we have:t t1 hk;qið Þ	 
 ¼ tðwÞ ¼ hk;qi: ð20Þ
We use the cancellations to derive the certainty equivalence of a possibilistic lottery. An application of t1 on both sides of
(18) yields:t1 t p1=w1;p2=w2; . . . ;pm=wm½ ð Þð Þ ¼ t1 cmax16i6mfpi  t wið Þgð Þ ð21Þ
¼ u for some u 2 U ð22ÞApplying t on both sides of (22) and using tt1 cancellation, we have:tð½p1=w1;p2=w2; . . . ;pm=wmÞ ¼ tðuÞ:
By Theorem 4, [p1/w1,p2/w2, . . . ,pm/wm]  Pu. Thus, we arrive at a useful view: u = t1(cmax16i6m{pit(wi)}) is the certainty
equivalence or scalar utility of [p1/w1,p2/w2, . . . ,pm/wm].
Lemma 3. t1 is strictly increasing:t1ðhk;qiÞP t1ðhk0;q0iÞ iff ðhk;qiÞðhk0;q0iÞ:3.4. Utility representation of pcb lottery
Let us now turn to the situation described by a partially consonant belief function (D is a pcb and denoted by Pl). Specif-
ically, Pl is a plausibility function overH. For example, [a1/w1,a2/w2, . . . ,ak/wk] denotes a pcb lottery where ai = Pl(d1(wi)) is
the plausibility of an event whose occurrence triggers prize wi. Notice that while probabilistic and possibilistic lotteries have
normalization conditions (
P
iai ¼ 1 and maxiai = 1), for a pcb lottery a necessary condition is
P
iai P 1.
Denote by L the set of pcb lotteries. Since pcb class includes both probability and possibility functions, we have inclu-
sions: LP  L and LP  L. As before we are interested in a preference relation  on L that is a weak order (complete and
transitive). Because LP and LP are subsets of L we can consider the restrictions of  on LP and LP denoted by P and P
respectively. We want P to satisfy vNM axiom system P and P satisﬁes axiom system PP. Note that LP \ LP is the set
of constant lotteries. To see that suppose ½a1=w1; a2=w2; . . . ; ak=wk 2 LP then the normalization condition is
Pk
i¼1ai ¼ 1. At
the same time ½a1=w1; a2=w2; . . . ; ak=wk 2 LP implies that maxiai = 1. Since aiP 0 it follows that ai = 1 for some i and aj = 0
for i– j. Thus the [a1/w1,a2/w2, . . . ,ak/wk] is the same as wi. Naturally, because P and P are restrictions of the same 
on LP and LP, they must be identical on the intersection of LP and LP which is U i.e., w  Pw0 iff w  Pw0 iff w  w0 (by def-
inition). Now we describe a list of axioms which amount to pulling together P1–P6 and PP1–PP6 for relation  on L.
B1 (Strong order on prizes) Preference  on U is identical withP(‘‘greater than or equal to”) relation on reals i.e., w1  w2
iff w1Pw2.
B2 (Reduction of compound lotteries) Any compound probabilistic (possibilistic) lottery is indifferent to a simple probabi-
listic (possibilistic) lottery with prizes in U. The plausibilities on the simple probabilistic (possibilistic) are calculated
according to belief function calculus.
B3 (Continuity of prize) Each prize w 2 U is indifferent to a possibilistic canonical lottery involving just 1 and 0.
B4 (Substitutability) In any lottery, a probabilistic lottery on an unambiguous node can be replaced by another indifferent
probabilistic lottery; a possibilistic lottery can be replaced by an indifferent possibilistic lottery.
B5 (Transitivity)  on L is transitive.
B6 (Monotonicity) For possibilistic (probabilistic) canonical lotteries [k/1,q/0]  [k0/1,q0/0] iff kP k0 and q 6 q0.
B7 (Equivalence between two forms) Each possibilistic canonical lottery is indifferent to a canonical probabilistic lottery.
B1, the same as P1 or PP1, is about the preference order on the set of prizes is the same as the numerical order. The state-
ment of B2 is an aggregation of P2 and PP2. The second part of B2 takes advantage of the fact that the belief function calculus
subsumes probabilistic and possibilistic calculi. Note that B2 does not say how a generic pcb compound lottery is converted
to a simple one. The reason for this silence is that in the general case, belief function theory does not have an operator that
calculates the plausibility of the union of two events directly from the plausibilities of each events.
Axiom B3 is identical to PP3 which requires that each prize w 2 U is indifferent to a possibilistic canonical lottery.
Axiom B4 implies both P4 and PP4. In a probabilistic lottery, every node is unambiguous, so the unambiguity qualiﬁcation
is not necessary. In the case of pcb lottery, this qualiﬁcation becomes necessary because besides unambiguous nodes, there
are ambiguous nodes for which the substitutability may not hold. The restriction of substitutability of probabilistic lotteries
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tains probabilistic L1 and the node associated with L1 is unambiguous and (2) L2 is a probabilistic lottery such that L1  L2
then B4 requires that L  L[L1/L2] where L[L1/L2] is obtained from L by replacing subtree L1 with tree L2. Also if L contains
possibilistic L1 and L2 is a possibilistic lottery such that L1  L2 then B4 requires that L  L[L1/L2].
B5 – transitivity of  is identical to P5 and PP5. B6 is pulling together P6 and PP6 and ensures the completeness ofwhich
together with B5 makes  a weak order. The rationale of B6 is summarized as ‘‘the more plausible the best the better” and
‘‘the less plausible the worst the better”. This monotonicity requirement holds for both probabilistic and possibilistic com-
parisons in the sense that the numbers can be interpreted either as probability or possibility as long as both canonical lot-
teries are of the same type i.e., they are both possibilistic or probabilistic. B6 can not be used to compare a possibilistic lottery
with a probabilistic lottery.
B7 requires that each possibilistic canonical lottery (a possibility function on {0,1}) is indifferent to a canonical probabilistic
lottery (a probability distribution on {0,1}). Note that canonical lotteries [0/1,1/0] and [1/1,0/0] have a dual possibilistic-prob-
abilistic interpretation and are equivalent to prizes 0 and 1. Since possibilistic and probabilistic canonical lotteries span the
whole range from 0 to 1, given any possibilistic canonical lottery, there exists a probabilistic canonical lottery equivalent to it.
B7 may seems harder to accept if one thinks of it as the requirement for a decision maker (DM) to be able to switch be-
tween the probability and possibility forms of uncertainty attached to the prizes in a canonical lottery. The difﬁculty, in our
opinion, is cognitive rather than intrinsic. A person may be more comfortable thinking in terms of probability than possibil-
ity. This is reasonable because of the long history of probability concept and its prevalent exposure in everyday discourse.
However this epistemic challenge would in no way void the validity of the assumption. Instead, it points to the need of ﬁnd-
ing a probability-possibility conversion that is easy to understand.
Our strategy to ﬁnd utility representation for  is to ﬁnd representations for  restricted on LP and LP and then use con-
stant lotteries which are intersection LP \ LP to connect the preference. We have a lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose preference relation  on L satisﬁes B1–B7 then its restriction on LP denoted by P satisﬁes P1–P6 and the
restriction on LP denoted by P satisﬁes PP1–PP6.Theorem 5.  on L satisﬁes axioms B1–B7 iff (a) and (b) and (c).
(a) There exists a function u : L ! ½0;1 such that L  L0 iff u(L)P u(L0);
(b) Restricted on LP – the set of possibilistic lotteries, u has the form:uð½p1=w1;p2=w2; . . . ;pm=wmÞ ¼ t1ðcmax16i6mfpitðwiÞgÞ;
for a function t deﬁned in Theorem 4 and t1 deﬁned in (19);(c) Suppose Li = [pi1/w1,pi2/w2, . . . ,pik/wk] for 1 6 i 6 s are possibilistic lotteries, the utility of pcb lottery [p1/L1,p2/L2, . . . , ps/Ls]
has the form:u p1=L1; p2=L2; . . . ; ps=Ls½ ð Þ ¼
Xs
i¼1
pit
1 cmax16j6k pijtðwjÞ
 	 

: ð23ÞBefore proving the theorem, several remarks are necessary. First, we verify that if pcb is probability, (23) reduces to the
familiar expression of expected utility. In this case Li are constant lotteries and, say, of the form ½1=wli  for 1 6 li 6 k.
cmax16j6k{pijt(wj)} becomes tðwli Þ. Hence, t1(cmax16j6k{pijt(wj)}) becomes t1ðtðwli ÞÞ ¼ wli because of cancellation t1t.
So, the right-hand side of (23) becomes
Ps
i¼1piwli .
Next, the lottery in part (c) [p1/L1,p2/L2, . . . ,ps/Ls] with pi are probabilities and Li are possibilistic lotteries must come from
act of the form fAi,!fAi j1 6 i 6 sg where fAi is an act deﬁned on Ai – the maximal foci of pcb. This is an implication of Lemma
1. In order for pi to be additive each conditioning event must be a union of some foci Ai of the pcb. On the other hand, in order
for Li to be possibilistic, the conditioning event must be a subset of some Ai. To satisfy both conditions the conditioning event
must be exact Ai.
Next, we note that unlike its special cases for probabilistic and possibilistic lotteries, for a general pcb lottery ½ai=wisi¼1
where ai are plausibilities the closed-form expression of uð½ai=wisi¼1Þ does not directly include ai. The utility computation
for an arbitrary act (tree) follows two steps. The ﬁrst step constructs the equivalent single-stage act by collapsing all the
paths leading to prizes. By conditioning the simple act on maximal foci of the pcb the second step constructs the equivalent
two-stage act in the form in part (c) for which formula in Eq. (23) is applied. Combining with the ﬁrst remark, it is clear that
utility for pcb act is separable for unambiguous events.
Finally, the key fact that allows a combination two utility representations is that a prize has a dual probabilistic-possibi-
listic view i.e., LP \ LP ¼ U.
3.5. Binary utility extraction and ambiguity attitude
In practical applications, an operational problem a decision maker (DM) must solve before she can use formula in (23) is
to ﬁnd function t. This can be done via playing likelihood gambles as described in Section 3.3. This activity is analogous to the
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probability. As a practical choice, the likelihood gamble game can be repeated for a large enough number of points inW and
then the neighbor points are connected to get a whole utility curve. There is an alternative in which less DM introspection is
compensated by an assumption of parametric form for utility function. Instead of estimating whole empirical utility curve,
the behavioral data of DM is used to estimate her behavioral parameter.
Let us re-examine the likelihood gamble. Suppose that DM is indifferent between value w and having (possibilistic) lot-
tery [kw/1,qw/0] where kw, qw are normalized likelihoods for (gamble) parameter values h1 and h2, respectively. This indif-
ference can also be analyzed from a Bayesian point of view. Assume DM has a prior probability, says cw, on h1. The posteriors
are4 Am
connectPrðh1jxÞ ¼ cwkwcwkw þ ð1 cwÞqw
; Prðh2jxÞ ¼ ð1 cwÞqwcwkw þ ð1 cwÞqw
: ð24ÞThe indifference implies equality chain of expected utilities (note that 8w 2 U;uðwÞ ¼ w):
w ¼ uðwÞ ¼ Prðh1jxÞ:uð1Þ þ Prðh2jxÞ:uð0Þ ¼ Prðh1jxÞ: ð25ÞSubstituting (24) into (25), one can solve for cw in terms of w, kw and qw.cw ¼
qww
kw  ðkw  qwÞw
¼ 1þ ð1wÞkw
wqw
 1
: ð26ÞThe computed quantity cw is called the implicit prior at w. In principle the implicit prior can vary for different values of w, but
we make an assumption that it is constant i.e., cw = c for all w. From a practical point of view, the constant-implicit-prior
assumption reduces the estimation of (binary) utility curve to the estimation of a single number. Suppose that the likelihood
gamble exercise is conducted for k observations xi for 1 6 i 6 k. The corresponding computed implicit priors are ci. One of the
most convenient estimate suggested by the estimation theory is the average i.e.,c^ ¼ 1
k
Xk
i¼1
ci:Given the parameter value c the relationship between scalar value w and equivalent binary utility hk(w),q(w)i is as follows
(see (24)):w ¼ t1 kðwÞ; qðwÞh ið Þ ¼ ckðwÞ
ckðwÞ þ ð1 cÞqðwÞ : ð27ÞIt follows that:kðwÞ
qðwÞ ¼
w
ð1wÞ
ð1 cÞ
c
: ð28ÞTaking into account max (k(w),q(w)) = 1, one can solve for 0 < w < 1:kðwÞ ¼
w
1w
1c
c if
w
1w
1c
c 6 1
1 otherwise
(
; ð29Þ
qðwÞ ¼
1 if w1w
1c
c 6 1
1w
w
c
1c otherwise
(
: ð30ÞLet us give an interpretation to c. In particular, from (27), t1(h1,1i) = c. Recall that h1,1i = t([1/1,1/0]). In other words, h1,1i is
the binary utility associated with the fair likelihood gamble in which the likelihoods of getting 1 and 0 are equal. Using a
symmetry argument, one can argue that the ‘‘fair” price or the certain equivalence for this gamble should be the middle point
0.5 between u(0) = 0 and u(1) = 1. In this case (c = 0.5), we say DM is ambiguity neutral. If c > 0.5, DM is paying a ‘‘premium”
price to enjoy the ambiguity in the fair gamble. In this case we say that DM is ambiguity seeking.4 In the last case of c < 0.5
which is reasonably expected to hold for plurality of decision makers, DM pays a ‘‘discount” price for the fair gamble because of
ambiguity in it. We say DM is ambiguity averse. Thus, c characterizes the ambiguity attitude of the decision maker.
This classiﬁcation of ambiguity attitude mirrors the classiﬁcation of attitudes toward risk (probabilistic uncertainty). Risk
seeking behavior is characterized by convexity of the utility curve; risk averse – concavity and risk neutral – linearity. The
differentiating term ‘‘ambiguity” signals the non-probabilistic nature of uncertainty expressible by DS plausibility, statistical
likelihood, or possibility based on fuzzy sets. For more discussion on ambiguity attitude and its relation to risk attitude read-
ers are referred to [12].biguity seeking behavior can exist and be justiﬁed by analogous arguments used to justify risk seeking behavior. Moreover, as it will be discussed in
ion with Choquet expected utility (CEU) model, ranking according to CEU calculated w.r.t. plausibility function exhibits ambiguity seeking character.
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DM’s risk attitude via a convention to measure the prizew 2 U in risk-adjusted utility. If we want to account for risk explicitly
we can do so by introducing a function r : $ ! U where $ ismonetary domain. The expression of pcb utility (23) then becomes:Table 1
Uncerta
eciD
m 1{(
m 1{(
m 3{(
m 3{(
Pl(.|
Pl(.|u p1=L1; p2=L2; . . . ; ps=Ls½ ð Þ ¼
Xs
i¼1
pi  t1 cmax16j6k pij  t rðwjÞ
	 
 	 

: ð31ÞIn this utility expression, risk attitude is handled by r, ambiguity attitude by t and uncertainty information by p and p. They
are all separate. Notice also that in case pcb is a probability function (partition of singletons, pi1 = 1), so cmax in effect dis-
appears and because of cancellation t1t, decision maker’s ambiguity attitude effect also disappears as naturally expected.
4. Examples
Example 3. Consider acts described in Fig. 1. The situation is a dice roll with faces numbered from 1 to 6. The act on the right
is f = {{2,4,6} ,! 0,{1,3} ,! 0.5, {5} ,! 1}.
It is known that uncertainty is described by a pcb given in Table 1. For example: m({1}) = .2, m({1,2}) = .1, m({3,4}) = .2
and m({3,4,5,6}) = .5; the partition size s = 2 with p1 = Pl({1,2}) = .3, p2 = Pl({3,4,5,6}) = .7; the conditional plausibility
Plð1jf1; 2gÞ ¼ 1; Plð2jf1; 2gÞ ¼ 13.
The act f is equivalent to {{1,2} ,! {2 ,! 0,1 ,! 0.5},{3,4,5,6} ,! {{4,6} ,! 0,3 ,! .5,5 ,! 1}}. Assume ambiguity aversion
with c = 0.4, t(1) = h1,0i, t(0) = h0,1i and from Eqs. (29), (30) it follows t(0.5) = h1, .67i.
The possibilistic lottery that corresponds to act {2 ,! 0,1 ,! 0.5} is [.33/h0,1i,1/h1,0.67i] has binary utility h1,0.67i and the
certainty equivalence is 0.5.
The possibilistic lottery that corresponds to act {{4,6} ,! 0,3 ,! .5,5 ,! 1} is 1=h0; 1i;1=h1; 0:67i; 57 =h1; 0i
 
has binary
utility:maxð0;1; :71Þ;maxð1;0:67;0Þh i ¼ 1;1h i;
and the certainty equivalence by Eq. (27) is 0.4.
Finally, the utility of the act – its certainty equivalence – isuðf Þ ¼ 0:3  0:5þ 0:7  0:4 ¼ 0:43 Example 4. We offer our treatment of Ellsberg’s paradox [7]. This is one in a series of experiments used to demonstrate that
rational behavior under ambiguity violates Savage’s sure-thing principle. In an urn, there are 90 balls of the same size. The
balls are painted one of three colors: red, yellow and white. It is known that 30 balls are red. The proportions of yellow and white
are not known. Ellsberg considers four gambles. IA = {red ,! 1,{white,yellow} ,! 0} that offers $1 if a randomly drawn ball is
red, nothing otherwise. IB = {yellow ,! 1,{white, red} ,! 0} offers $1 if the ball is yellow, nothing otherwise. IIA = {{red,white} ,!
1,yellow ,! 0} offers $1 if the ball is red or white, nothing if the ball is yellow. IIB = {{yellow,white} ,! 1, red ,! 0} offers $1 if the
ball is yellow or white and nothing if it is red.
Ellsberg discussed ﬁndings that a sizable proportion of respondents preferred IA to IB and, at the same time, preferred IIB
to IIA. This observed preference is not consistent with the sure-thing principle because the pair (IIA, IIB) is different from the
pair (IA, IB) only by the level of prize for white balls.
The uncertainty in the problem is nicely described by a pcb with 2 foci. mðfredgÞ ¼ 13 and mðfyellow;whitegÞ ¼ 23. This pcb
decomposes into PðfredgÞ ¼ 13 and Pðfyellow;whitegÞ ¼ 23 and P(yellowj{yellow,white}) =P(whitej{yellow,white}) = 1. We consider
three cases of ambiguity attitude corresponding to ambiguity averse, neutral and seeking.
Case 1 (Ambiguity aversion). We assume binary utility function ta($1) = h1,0i, ta($0) = h0,1i and ta($.4) = h1,1i. The ﬁrst two
equalities are natural since $1 is the best outcome and $0 is the worst outcome. The last equality implies that the implicit
prior probability is .4 indicating somewhat ambiguity aversion. In Figs. 3 and 4 we show the calculation of mixed utility for
the gambles. We have ua(IA) = .33, ua(IB) = .27, ua(IIA) = .60 and ua(IIB) = .67. This means IIB  IIA  IA  IB. These preferences
are consistent with the observed behavior.inty about the dice.
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Fig. 3. Utility calculation for IA and IB under ambiguity aversion c = 0.4.
Fig. 4. Utility calculation for IIA and IIB under ambiguity aversion c = 0.4.
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2
3 ;unðIIBÞ ¼ 23. This means IIA  IIB  IA  IB.Case 3 (Ambiguity seeking). We have ts($1) = h1,0i, ts($0) = h0,1i and ts($.6) = h1,1i and us(IA) = .333, us(IB) = 0.4,
us(IIA) = 0.733, us(IIB) = 0.667. This means IIA  IIB  IB  IA.5. Related works
This work touches two streams of research developed somewhat separately in the economics and artiﬁcial intelligence
communities. On the one hand, ever since Ellsberg’s pioneering paper [7], decision making under ambiguity has been an ac-
tive topic of discussion in economics. On the other hand, DS belief function theory originated from statistics and ﬁnds its
vibrancy in computer science and artiﬁcial intelligence communities because it can offer a balance of expanded uncertainty
expressiveness and a well-deﬁned computational mechanism. A detailed review of the current activities in these ﬁelds is
beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, we want to sketch a picture of contrasts and similarities with our approach to deci-
sion making.
First of all, it must be noted that all the approaches to be reviewed below are applicable for uncertainty measures that are
more general than pcb class. In situations described by pcb, lacking a decision theory speciﬁcally developed for this class (we
are not aware of any other), those theories could be applied. Therefore, it is useful to have a guide to help a DM in her choice
of theories such a situation.
Decision models with belief functions are broadly divided into two groups. The basic idea of the ﬁrst group that includes
Smets and Kennes [25,26] and Cobb and Shenoy [2] among others, is to transform a belief function into a probability function
and use the latter for decision making. For the second group that includes Jaffray and Wakker [16,18,28] and Yager [32], the
main idea is to combine expected utility with decision under ignorance.
Smets and Kennes [25,26] argue for ‘‘transferable belief model” or TBM that is a two-level process. At the credal level, an
agent uses belief functions to represent and to reason with uncertainty. When there is a need to make a decision, the agent
moves to another pignistic level in which the belief function is transformed to a probability function. The vNM expected util-
ity is calculated with respect to this probability function. Speciﬁcally, in the pignistic transformation, the mass assigned to a
subset is divided equally to each element in the set. For example, the pignistic transformation of the pcb in Ellsberg’s paradox
is a probability function.H red yellow whitePbet .33 .33 .33With respect to Pbet the utilities of the four lotteries are utbm(IA) = utbm(IB) = .33 and utbm(IIA) = utbm(IIB) = .66. The values
do not explain Ellsberg’s paradox. Broadly speaking, as TBM utility is calculated w.r.t. a probability function, it is not able to
account for DM attitude toward ambiguity (aversion/seeking). Note that the preference by utbm for Ellsberg’s example is ob-
served in the case of ambiguity neutrality of our framework (Example 4), although in general, this agreement is not neces-
sary. Also, the pignistic transformation is inconsistent with Dempster’s rule of combination [2]. The point is that TBM can be
used only if the ambiguity attitude does not matter.
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ity form i.e., probability function is obtained by normalization of plausibility values of singletons. For the pcb in Ellsberg’s
example the numbers are as follows:5HNote that there does not exist a belief functiredon whose Bel or Pl is identical to this m. That is,yellowthis capacity is outside the class of belief functionwhitePPl .20 .40 .40With PPl, the utilities of the four lotteries are uPl(IA) = .20, uPl(IB) = .40 and uPl(IIA) = .60, uPl(IIB) = .80. As with utbm, this
utility function is not able to explain Ellsberg’s paradox and can not account for ambiguity attitudes. Notice that the prob-
ability assigned to a singleton (e.g., red) in the original pcb are adjusted downward after translation. However, it is possible to
argue that the plausibility transformation is for the Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions, in which it is inappropriate
to interpret belief and plausibility functions as lower and upper bounds on some true but unknown probabilities since these
semantics are inconsistent with Dempster’s rule of combination:
Jaffray and Wakker [16,18,28] propose a decision model with belief function that combines linear utility with Hurwicz’s
criterion for decision under ignorance. Suppose a belief functionm has foci {A1,A2, . . .,Ak}. Act fmaps Ai into f ðAiÞ#U and the
mass of Ai will be transferred to f(Ai). Thus, underm, each act corresponds to a belief function on U. Any belief function can be
viewed as linear combination of elementary belief functions e.g.,
Pk
i¼1mðAiÞ  ef ðAiÞ where ef ðAiÞ is an elementary belief function
with f(Ai) as the single focusuJðf Þ ¼
Xk
i¼1
mðAiÞuJ ef ðAiÞ
	 

:ef ðAiÞ can be interpreted as ignorance on Ai. Hurwicz’s criterion on the set of outcome f(Ai) yields:uJðefAi Þ ¼ a infðf ðAiÞÞ þ ð1 aÞ supðf ðAiÞÞ:
In this approach, the ambiguity attitude is expressed by coefﬁcient a – the weight attached to the worst outcome in f(Ai) –
such that the more ambiguity averse the DM is the higher the a. For example at a = 0.6, for Ellsberg’s gambles, uJ(IA) = 0.33,
uJ(IB) = 0.67(0.6 * 0 + 0.4 * 1) = 0.268, uJ(IIA) = 0.33 + 0.67 * 0.4 = 0.598 and uJ(IIB) = 0.67. These values explain Ellsberg’s para-
dox nicely. Wakker [29] notes that ‘‘[Jaffray’s] models, developed 20 years ago, achieve a tractability and a separation be-
tween risk attitudes, ambiguity attitudes, and ambiguity beliefs that have not yet been obtained in other models popular
today”. However, a problemwith Hurwicz’s rule is that it can lead to dynamically inconsistent behavior [17]. A more detailed
comparison between Jaffray–Wakker’s approach and the one presented in this paper is found in [9].
In economics, two widely used models for decision under ambiguity are the Choquet expected utility (CEU) model by Sch-
meidler [22] using capacities and maximin expected utility with multiple priors by Gilboa and Schmeidler [14]. In recent
years, the focus is shifting to dynamic consistency issues [20]. Schmeidler[22], Sarin and Wakker [21] propose Choquet ex-
pected utility (CEU) for non-additive probability or capacity. A real value set function m on H is a capacity if it satisﬁes nor-
malization conditions m(;) = 0, m(H) = 1, and monotonicity m(A) 6 m(B) if A  B. Note that both forms Bel and Pl of a belief
function satisfy the deﬁnition of capacity.
For simplicity, assume the prizes are ordered w1 > w2 >    > wk with conventions wk+1 = 0 and E0 = ;. For a decision d with
d1(wi) = Ei, 1 6 i 6 k, CEU w.r.t. capacity m is deﬁned asCEUðdÞ ¼
Xk
i¼1
wi wiþ1ð Þ  m [ij¼1Ej
 
¼
Xk
i¼1
wi m [j¼ij¼0Ej
 
 m [j¼i1j¼0 Ej
  
: ð32ÞFor example, for a capacity given in the following table, utilities of Ellsberg’s gambles are calculated as follows. For IA,
E1 = {red}, E2 = {yellow, white} because red is associated with $1 prize and yellow, white with 0, CEUðIAÞ ¼ 13. Similarly,
CEUðIBÞ ¼ 14 ;CEUðIIAÞ ¼ 12 and CEUðIIBÞ ¼ 23. These numbers exhibit an ambiguity aversion behavior IA  IB and IIB  IIB.5red yellow white red, yellow red, white yellow, whitem 1
31
41
41
21
22
3The CEU representation is obtained by replacing the independence axiom in the set of axioms that enables vNM expected
utility representation with ‘‘co-monotonic independence” axiom that requires independence property for pairs of co-mono-
tonic acts only.
The main difference between the CEU model and Jaffray–Wakker’s model (and the model in this paper for that matter)
concerns the expression of ambiguity attitude. In the CEU model, the ambiguity attitude is inseparably blent with the uncer-
tainty (ambiguity) information. A capacity m is said to be convex (concave) if "A, B, m(A [ B) + m(A \ B) is greater (less) than or
equal to m(A) + m(B). Schmeidler [22] shows that a decision maker is ambiguity averse (seeking) iff the capacity is convexs.
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as the most useful information has objective sources: experiments, data, observations. For example, according to a widely ac-
cepted guideline in medicine [15] the information obtained via randomized clinical trials is considered most useful, less useful is
information obtained via systematic observational studies, the least useful is the kind of anecdotal/subjective observation. The
subjective character of capacity measures does not facilitate information collection from the objective sources.
For an illustration, let us calculate CEU w.r.t. Bel and Pl forms of the belief function in Ellsberg’s example.6
ar
In Schmeidler’s p
rived from evidencredaper, uncertainty is
e.yellowsupposed to be subjecwhitetive too. A strict holdred, yellowto this position would disred, whitequalify a CEU applicationyellow, whiteBel 0.33 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.67
Pl 0.33 0.67 0.67 1.0 1.0 0.67CEUBel(IA) = CEUPl(IA) = .33. CEUBel(IB) = 0 and CEUPl(IB) = .67. CEUBel(IIA) = 0.33, CEUPl(IIA) = 1, CEUBel(IIB) = 0.67 and
CEUPl(IIB) = 0.67. Therefore, according to CEUBel, IA  BelIB and IIB  BelIIA; while according to CEUPl, IB  PlIA and IIA  PlIIB.
Clearly, CEUBel can explain Ellsberg’s paradox and exhibits ambiguity aversion while CEUPl exhibits an opposite ambiguity
(seeking) attitude.
This calculation illustrates another dilemma of using CEU, which was designed for capacity, for a more restricted class of
belief functions, especially those that arrived from objective evidence. On the one hand, Bel and Pl represent different capac-
ities. In fact, Bel is convex while Pl is concave (Bel(A [ B) + Bel(A \ B)P Bel(A) + Bel(B) and Pl(A [ B) + Pl(A \ B) 6 Pl(A) + Pl(B)).
Therefore, CEU w.r.t. Bel and Pl exhibit opposite behaviors toward ambiguity. On the other hand, as mentioned in Section 2,
bel (Bel) and plausibility (Pl) are just two among several equivalent forms of a belief function. These forms contain the same
uncertainty information of objective character, for example, extracted from statistical evidence. It is reasonable to expect
that this information can be used by different decision makers with different ambiguity attitudes e.g., different patients fac-
ing the choice of therapy given the public medical data about alternative therapies. The fact that CEUBel and CEUPl represent
difference preference relations raises a question about which one is correct for a given decision maker. One might respond
that the selection of using Bel or Pl depends on ambiguity attitude. That is if a decision maker is ambiguity averse, her pref-
erence should be represented by CEUBel. If another decision maker is ambiguity seeking, her preference should be repre-
sented by CEUPl. However, for a third decision maker who is ambiguity neutral, neither CEUBel nor CEUPl is good for her.
In general, it is not clear how to compute preference using CEU for a decision maker whose attitude toward ambiguity differs
from that of the ﬁrst two. The point is that while CEU can certainly apply to some form of pcb, this does not necessarily mean
that it should if the uncertainty information is objective in character.
6. Summary and conclusions
This paper studies decision making with partially consonant belief functions introduced by Walley [30]. Pcb is important
because (1) it uniﬁes and generalizes two widely used uncertainty frameworks, namely, probability and possibility; (2) it is
the only subclass of belief functions, which is consistent with the likelihood principle of statistics. Pcb has a nice interpre-
tation, it can be viewed as a possibilistic variable conditional on a probabilistic variable.
We use an axiomatic approach for the problem. A distinct feature of our approach is the interpretation of plausibility as
statistical likelihood, not as betting rates found in most other works on decision making with DS belief functions. We prove a
representation theorem for a preference relation on pcb lotteries. Pcb utility is a mixed construct that subsumes both linear
utility for probabilistic lottery and binary utility for possibilistic lottery.
Our approach is tractable and offers separate modelings of different factors involved in the decision process: risk attitude,
ambiguity attitude and uncertainty information. In practice, this separation is important as it allows for those factors to be
investigated independently from each other. An open question is how to extend this approach for the general case of DS be-
lief functions.
Appendix A. Proofs of theorems and lemmas
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
(a) Deﬁne K(A) = {AijjAij \ A– ;} – the collection of foci that intersect with A. By deﬁnition:
PlðAÞ ¼
X
Aij2KðAÞ
mðAijÞ ðA:1Þ
PlðAi \ AÞ ¼
X
Aij2KðAi\AÞ
mðAijÞ ðA:2Þfor belief function
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words, if Aij intersects with A then it intersects with (Ai \ A) only. It implies that KðAÞ ¼ [si¼1KðA \ AiÞ and
K(A \ Ai) \ K(A \ Ak) = ;. From Eqs. (A.1), (A.2) we have PlðAÞ ¼
Ps
i¼1PlðAi \ AÞ.
Now consider Pl(Ai \ A). Since the foci inside Ai are nested, for each A there is an innermost focus Ai‘ for some ‘ it inter-
sects with. So PlðAi \ AÞ ¼
P‘
j¼0mðAijÞ. For h 2 A \ Ai‘, clearly PlðhÞ ¼
P‘
j¼0mðAijÞ. So, Pl(Ai \ A) = Pl(h). Since "h 2 Ai \ A,
Pl(Ai \ A)P Pl(h), combine both facts we have Pl(Ai \ A) = max{Pl(h)jh 2 Ai \ A}.
(b) By Dempster rule in Eq. (3), conditioning on B creates new foci which are Aij \ B. Clearly, if Aij have pcb structure then
so do the conditional foci.
(c) Suppose B is unambiguous. This means there is no focus Aij such that Aij \ B– ; and Aij \ B–;. Equivalently, for any
focus Aij either Aij \ B = ; or Aij \ B ¼ ;. This means Aij#B or Aij # B. Take j = 0, for all i either Ai ¼ Ai0#B or Ai = Ai0 # B.
Since fAigsi¼1 is a partition of H, B ¼ [si¼1ðB \ AiÞ ¼ [fAijAi#Bg. If B is a union of some Ai then no focus can intersect
with both B and B and hence it is unambiguous.
(d). The ‘‘only if” direction is obvious. If B # Ai for some i, the foci of the conditional belief function Pl(jB) are nested as
they are of the form B \ Aij. For the ‘‘if” direction, suppose Pl(jB) is a possibility function, then the foci of this condi-
tional pcb are nested. The conditional foci are Aij \ B. Suppose B \ Ai– ; and B \ Ak– ; for i– k. For j = 0, since Ai0 = Ai
and {Ai} is a partition of H, (B \ Ai) \ (B \ Ak) = ;. This contradicts the supposition, therefore B # Ai for some i. This
completes the proof. h
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
()) Given the plausibility function in (9), we need to show that functions P and Pi deﬁned by (10) and (11) are probability
function on A and possibility functions on Ai. Obviously, by (10) P(A)P 0 for any A 2 A and P(H) = 1. For P to be a
probability, we only need to show that P(A [ A0) = P(A) + P(A0) for A;A0 2 A such that A \ A0 = ;. By (9)PðA [ A0Þ ¼
Xs
i¼1
maxfPlðhÞ j h 2 Ai \ ðA [ A0Þg; ðA:3Þ
PðAÞ ¼
Xs
i¼1
maxfPlðhÞ j h 2 Ai \ Ag; ðA:4Þ
PðA0Þ ¼
Xs
i¼1
maxfPlðhÞ j h 2 Ai \ A0g; ðA:5Þ
Because A and A0 are disjoint, each Ai cannot belong to both of them. If h 2 Ai \ (A [ A0) then either h 2 Ai \ A (counted
in (A.4)) or h 2 Ai \ A0 (counted in (A.5)) but not both. Therefore, P(A [ A0) = P(A) + P(A0).
Next, we need to show that Pi deﬁned in (11) is a possibility function. It is enough to show that Pi(Ai) = 1 and
Pi(B [ B0) = max (Pi(B), Pi(B0)) for B;B0 2 Ai. By (4):
Pi Aið Þ ¼ Pl Ai \ Aið ÞPl Aið Þ ¼ 1; ðA:6Þ
Pi B [ B0
	 
 ¼ Pl Ai \ B [ B0
	 
	 

Pl Aið Þ ¼
Pl B [ B0	 

Pl Aið Þ ; ðA:7Þ
The condition B;B0 2 Ai means B,B0 # Ai, therefore by (9):
PlðB [ B0Þ ¼maxfPlðhÞ j h 2 ðB [ B0Þg; ðA:8Þ
PlðBÞ ¼maxfPlðhÞ j h 2 Bg; ðA:9Þ
PlðB0Þ ¼maxfPlðhÞ j h 2 B0g; ðA:10Þ
This means Pi(B [ B0) = max (Pi(B), Pi(B0)).() Suppose Pl() is a probability function (denoted by P) on A and s conditionals Pl(jAi) are possibility functions (denoted
by Pi) on Ai, we will show that Pl is a pcb and satisﬁes (9).
We use two well known facts: (1) the foci of a probability function are singletons in its frame and (2) the foci of a pos-
sibility function are nested.
From the fact that [si¼1Ai ¼ H and the sum
Ps
i¼1PlðAiÞ ¼ 1 we conclude that the foci of Pl are constrained within each Ai.
Because if there were a focus that intersected with at least two Ai, Aj then the mass of that focus would be counted
twice in Pl(Ai) and Pl(Aj) then the sum would be strictly more than 1. Therefore, conditioning on Ai does not change
the foci within that set. It follows that the foci of conditional Pi are also the foci of original Pl. Thus, Pl is a pcb and
by Lemma 1 satisﬁes (9). h
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Suppose, on the contrary, there is hk,qi such that there does not exist any w 2 U ¼ ½0;1 for which t(w) = hk,qi. Consider
two sets U1 ¼ fw 2 ½0;1j hk;qitðwÞg and U2 ¼ fw 2 ½0;1j tðwÞhk;qig. Clearly 0 2 U1 and 1 2 U2. Because the order on
W is complete which is directly derived from the deﬁnition, for any w 2 U either w 2 U1 or w 2 U2 i.e., U1 [ U2 ¼ U. Also
U1 \ U2 ¼ ; because if the intersection is not empty then it is equal to hk,qi. It must be the case that supU1 ¼ inf U2 because
otherwise a w3 in between would belong to neither U1 nor U2 which contradicts U1 [ U2 ¼ U . Denote w ¼ sup U1 ¼ inf U2,
let t(w*) = hk0,q0i. For an increasing sequence {w1i} in U1 with limi ?1w1i = w* and a decreasing sequence {w2i} in U2 with
limi?1 w2i =w*, because of continuity assumption limi ?1‘(w1i) = limi?1 ‘(w2i) = ‘(w*) = k0. On the one hand, because
w1i 2 U1, ‘(w1i) 6 k so at the limit k0 6 k. On the other hand, because w2i 2 U2, ‘(w2i)P k and at the limit k0 P k. Thus,
k0 = k. Similarly it can be shown that q0 = q. So w* is the point in U with t(w*) = hk,qi. This contradicts the supposition that
there does not exist any w 2 U ¼ ½0;1 for which t(w) = hk,qi and completes the proof. h
A.4. Proof of Lemma 3
For w;w0 2 U; tðwÞtðw0Þ iff w  Pw0 iff wPw0. The ﬁrst link is due to Theorem 4, the second is due to axiom PP1. Setting
w = t1(hk,qi) and w0 = t1(hk0,q0i) and using tt1 cancellation we have the lemma. h
A.5. Proof of Lemma 4
Let us consider the case of P. Since U  L, for w;w0 2 U;wPw0 iff w  w0. By B1, w  w0 iff wPw0. So P satisﬁes P1.
B2 implies P2. Suppose L is a compound lottery and L0 is the equivalent lottery obtained from L by collapsing paths from
the root to leaves. If (a) L is probabilistic i.e., the uncertainty on each node is described by a (conditional) probability func-
tion; (b) the plausibility on each collapsed edge of L0 is obtained by multiplying the plausibilities on the path (belief function
calculus) then L0 is also a probabilistic i.e., the sum of plausibilities on its edges is 1. Since both L and L0 are probabilistic,
L  PL0 iff L  L0. The latter is guaranteed by B2 so B2 implies P2.
B3, B5 and B7 imply P3. For each w 2 U, by B3 there is a possibilistic canonical CP such that w  CP. By B7 there is a prob-
abilistic canonical CP such that CP  CP. By transitivity B5, w  CP.
B4 implies P4. Supposew  CP where CP is a probabilistic canonical lottery, L[w] is a probabilistic lottery containing leaf w
and L[x/CP] is the lottery obtained by substituting w by CP. Because constant lotteries are probabilistic and any node in a
probabilistic lottery is unambiguous, by B4, L[w]  L[w/CP]. If L is probabilistic then L[w/CP] is also probabilistic. Therefore,
L[w]  P L[w/CP].
B5 implies P5. Because  on L is transitive and P is a restriction of  on LP then P is also transitive.
B6 implies P6. If [k/1,q/0] and [k0/1,q0/0] are probabilistic canonical lotteries i.e., q = 1  k and q0 = 1  k0. By B6 [k/1,q/
0]  [k0/1,q0/0] iff kP k0 and q 6 q0 iff kP k0 because of additivity. Thus, [k/1, (1  k)/0]  P[k0/1, (1  k0)/0] iff kP k0.
The case of P is similar. h
A.6. Proof of Theorem 5
()) We prove (b), (c) and (a) in that order.
(b) Suppose  on L satisﬁes B1– B7. By Lemma 4, the restriction on LP,  P, satisﬁes PP1–PP6. By Theorem 4,  P is
represented by utility function t given by Eq. (18). In particular, t([p1/w1,p2/w2,. . ., pm/wm]) = cmax16i6m{pit(wi)}. It fol-
lows that for L; L0 2 LP, L  P L0 iff t(L)t(L0). By Lemma 3, t(L)t(L0) iff t1(t(L))P t1(t(L0)). So, L  P L0 iff
t1(t(L))P t1(t(L0)). Thus, t1(cmax16i6m{pit(wi)}) is the certainty equivalence of [p1/w1,p2/w2,. . .,pm/wm], hence, is
its utility.
(c) Suppose L = [p1/L1,p2/L2,. . .,ps/Ls] where pi are probabilities i.e.,
Ps
i¼1pi ¼ 1 and Li = [pi1/w1,pi2/w2,. . .,pik/wk] are pos-
sibilistic lotteries. By part (b), Li  Pui for 1 6 i 6 swhere ui = t1(cmax16j6k{pij t(wj)}). Since P is the restriction of  ,
Li  Pui also means Li  ui. Because ui is a possibilistic lottery, axiom B4 allows Li to be substituted by ui i.e., [p1/L1,p2/
L2, . . . ,ps/Ls]  [p1/u1,p2/u2,. . .,ps/us]. The right hand side is a probabilistic lottery. By Lemma 4,  P the restriction of 
on probabilistic lotteries satisﬁes axioms P1–P6. By Theorem 3,  P is represented by linear utility function
uð½p1=u1; p2=u2; . . . ; ps=usÞ ¼
Ps
i¼1piui. Substituting the expression for ui we have the certainty equivalence of L i.e.,L 
Xs
i¼1
t1ðcmax16i6mfpitðwiÞgÞ ðA:11Þ
(a) Let us consider a pcb lottery Lf = [a1/w1, a2/w2,. . .,ak/wk] that is induced by act f = {C1 ,! w1,C2 ,!w2,. . ., Ck ,!wk}
with {Ci} is a partition ofH and pcb Pl has the focus structure: Ai0 
 Ai1 . . . ;
 Aimi for 1 6 i 6 s such that {Ai0} is a par-
tition of H. The link between the lottery and the act is via ai = Pl(Ci) for 1 6 i 6 k.
Consider the following act: g = {A10 ,! f,A20 ,! f,. . .,As0 ,! f}. It is not difﬁcult to show that f and g are equivalent acts.
As functions from H to U no matter which h 2H is the true parameter, the prize delivered by f and g are the same.
Viewing g as a rooted tree, we note (Theorem 2) that restricted on the algebra formed from {Ai0j1 6 i 6 s}Pl is additive
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Namely, denote pi = Pl(Ai0) and pij = Pl(CjjAi0) for 1 6 i 6 s and 1 6 j 6 k. The lottery induced from g is Lg = [p1/L1, p2/
L2, . . .,ps/Ls] where Li = [pi1/w1, pi2/w2, . . . ,pik/wk]. By Eq. (A.11)
Ps
i¼1t
1ðcmax16i6mfpitðwiÞgÞ Lg. Due to the principle
of equivalence Lf  Lg and transitivity of  it follows
Ps
i¼1t
1ðcmax16i6mfpitðwiÞgÞ Lf.
For an arbitrary lottery in L, due to the principle of equivalence, one can ﬁnd one-stage lottery that is indifferent to.
Suppose u and u0 are certainty equivalences of single-stage L and L0 calculated by Eq. (A.11) i.e., L  u and L0  u0. So
L  L0 iff u  u0. Because of axiom B1, u  u0 iff uP u0. Thus, L  L0 iff uP u0.() Suppose a preference relation u is deﬁned by function u given by Eq. (23) with continuous t and strictly increasing t1
deﬁned by Eq. (19) i.e., L1  uL2 if u(L1)P u(L2). We show that u satisﬁes B1 to B7. First, we verify the fact that pcb
utility (23) subsumes both linear utility for probabilistic lottery and the binary utility for possibilistic utility. If pcb is a
probability function, each element h 2H is a focus and each Li is a constant lottery wi. Because t1(t(wi)) = wi, Eq. (23)
becomes:u p1=w1;p2=w2; . . . ;pn=wn½ ð Þ ¼
Xn
i¼1
piwi
If pcb is a possibility function then s = 1 and p1 = 1, Eq. (23) reduces to:
uðL1Þ ¼ t1ðcmax16j6kfp1jtðwjÞgÞ
which is the binary utility for a possibilistic lottery wrapped by the strictly increasing t1. This observation allows us to
use Theorems 3 and 4.B1 is satisﬁed by deﬁnition because u(w) =w for w 2 U. B2. For a compound probabilistic (possibilistic) lottery L, because
u(L) 2 [0,1] as an implication of the observation that u reduces to expected (binary) utility. By deﬁnition L  uu(L). B3. By the
reverse clause of Theorem 4,  u satisﬁes PP3 which is the same as B3.
B4. Suppose L ¼ f. . . fE,!Lp1g . . .g contains a probabilistic subtree Lp1 associated with an unambiguous node E. Lp2 is also a
probabilistic lottery such that Lp1uLp2. Because E is unambiguous, by Lemma 1, it must be a union of some Ai. By deﬁnition of
u, Lp1uLp2 implies uðLp1Þ ¼ uðLp2Þ. uðLp1Þ and uðLp2Þ are expected utility because Lp1; Lp2 are probabilistic. Since utility expression is
separable for unambiguous events, the part of u(L) related to Lp1 is pðEÞuðLp1Þ. For the tree obtained by replacing Lp1 by Lp2, the
part related to Lp2 in uðL½Lp1=Lp2Þ is pðEÞuðLp2Þ. Therefore, uðLÞ ¼ uðL½Lp1=Lp2Þ.
Suppose L ¼ f. . . fE,!Lp1g . . .g contains possibilistic Lp1 associated with event E. Suppose Lp2 is another possibilistic such that
Lp1uLp2 . Since Lp1 is possibilistic, by Lemma 1, E is a subset of some Ai. Consider the possibilistic lottery L0 obtained from L by
conditioning on Ai: L
0 ¼ f. . . fE,!Lp1g . . .g. Lp1 is a subtree of L0 because node E associated with Lp1 is a subset of Ai. By Theorem 4,
since Lp1uLp2 and L0 is a possibilistic lottery, replacement of Lp1 by Lp2 leads to an indifferent lottery i.e., L0½Lp1 uL0½Lp1=Lp2 . So by
deﬁnition uðL0 ½Lp1 Þ ¼ uðL0 ½Lp1=Lp2 Þ. Again because of separability of utility on unambiguous events, in evaluation of u(L) and
uðL½Lp1=Lp2 Þ, Lp1 and Lp2 enter via L0½Lp1  and L0½Lp1=Lp2  respectively. Thus, uðLÞ ¼ uðL½Lp1=Lp2 Þ and hence LuL½Lp1=Lp2 .
B5. Because u has range in [0,1] the u is transitive. B6. This is an implication of Theorems 3 and 4. B7. Any possibilistic
lottery Lp is equivalent to the following canonical probabilistic lottery [u(Lp)/1, (1  u(Lp))/0]. This completes the proof. h
References
[1] J.O. Berger, R.L. Wolpert, The Likelihood Principle, second ed., Lecture Notes Monograph Series, Institute of Mathematical Statistics, Hayward,
California, 1988.
[2] B.R. Cobb, P.P. Shenoy, On the plausibility transformation method for translating belief function models to probability models, International Journal of
Approximate Reasoning 41 (3) (2006) 314–340.
[3] A. Dempster, A generalization of Bayesian inference, Journal of Royal Statistical Society Series B 30 (1968) 205–247 (with discussion).
[4] A. Dempster, The Dempster–Shafer calculus for statisticians, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 48 (2) (2008) 365–377.
[5] R. Diestel, Graph Theory, second ed., Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005.
[6] D. Dubois, T.H. Nguyen, H. Prade, Possibility theory, probability and fuzzy sets, in: D. Dubois, H. Prade (Eds.), Handbook of Fuzzy Sets Series, Kluwer
Academic, Boston, 2000, pp. 344–438.
[7] D. Ellsberg, Risk, ambiguity and the Savage’s axioms, Quarterly Journal of Economics 75 (4) (1961) 643–669.
[8] P.H. Giang, A decision theory for non-probabilistic uncertainty and its applications, PhD Thesis, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 2003.
[9] P.H. Giang, On Jaffray’s decision model for belief functions, in: Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Soft Methods in Probability and
Statistics, Springer, 2010.
[10] P.H. Giang, P.P. Shenoy, Statistical decisions using likelihood information without prior probabilities, in: A. Darwiche, N. Friedman (Eds.), Uncertainty
in Artiﬁcial Intelligence: Proceedings of the Eighteenth Conference (UAI–2002) (San Francisco, CA, 2002), Morgan Kaufmann, 2002, pp. 170–178.
[11] P.H. Giang, P.P. Shenoy, Decision making with partially consonant belief functions, in: C. Meek, U. Kjaerulff (Eds.), Uncertainty in Artiﬁcial Intelligence:
Proceedings of the Nineteenth Conference (UAI–2003) (San Francisco, CA, 2003), Morgan Kaufmann, 2003.
[12] P.H. Giang, P.P. Shenoy, Decision making on the sole basis of statistical likelihood, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 165 (2005) 137–163.
[13] P.H. Giang, P.P. Shenoy, Two axiomatic approaches to decision making using possibility theory, European Journal of Operational Research 162 (2)
(2005) 450–467.
[14] I. Gilboa, D. Schmeidler, Maximin expected utility with a non-unique prior, Journal of Mathematical Economics 18 (1989) 141–153.
[15] GRADE Working Group, Grading quality of evidence and strength of recommendations, BMJ 328 (2004) 1490–1498.
[16] J.-Y. Jaffray, Linear utility theory for belief functions, Operations Research Letters 8 (1989) 107–112.
[17] J.-Y. Jaffray, M. Jeleva, Information processing under imprecise risk with the Hurwicz criterion, in: Fifth International Symposium on Imprecise
Probability: Theories and Applications, ISIPTA’07, 2007.
[18] J.-Y. Jaffray, P. Wakker, Decision making with belief functions: compatibility and incompatibility with the sure-thing principle, Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty 8 (3) (1994) 255–271.
394 P.H. Giang, P.P. Shenoy / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 375–394[19] R.D. Luce, H. Raiffa, Games and Decision, John Wiley and Sons, 1957.
[20] M. Machina, Risk, ambiguity, and the rank-dependence axioms, American Economic Review 99 (1) (2009) 385–392.
[21] R. Sarin, P. Wakker, A simple axiomatization of nonadditive expected utility, Econometrica 60 (6) (1992) 1255–1272.
[22] D. Schmeidler, Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity, Econometrica 57 (3) (1989) 571–587.
[23] G. Shafer, A Mathematical Theory of Evidence, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976.
[24] G. Shafer, Belief functions and parametric models, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 44 (3) (1982) 322–352.
[25] P. Smets, Decision making in the tbm: the necessity of the pignistic transformation, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 38 (2) (2005)
133–147.
[26] P. Smets, R. Kennes, The transferable belief model, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 66 (2) (1994) 191–234.
[27] J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, third ed., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1953.
[28] P. Wakker, Dempster belief functions are based on the principle of complete ignorance, International Journal of Uncertainty Fuzziness and Knowledge-
Based Systems 8 (3) (2000) 271–284.
[29] P. Wakker, Jaffray’s Ideas on Ambiguity, Working Paper, Econometric Institute, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, 2009.
[30] P. Walley, Belief function representation of statistical evidence, The Annals of Statistics 15 (4) (1987) 1439–1465.
[31] P. Walley, Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities, Chapman and Hall, London, New York, 1991.
[32] R. Yager, Decision making under Dempster–Shafer uncertainties, International Journal of General Systems 20 (1992) 223–245.
[33] R. Yager, L. Liu, Classic works on the Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions, Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, vol. 219, Springer, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2008.
[34] L. Zadeh, Fuzzy set as a basis for a theory of possibility, Fuzzy Sets and Systems 1 (1978) 3–28.
